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Reviews
In Defense of FundamentalRights. By William E. Conklin. Alphen
aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sitjthoff & Nordhoff, 1979. Pp.
307. Price: $38.00.
The central question dealt with by William E. Conklin inIn Defense
of FundamentalRights is "Why are fundamental rights considered
fundamental?" (p. 2 ). In Part I he looks at traditional juridical
answers to this question (all of which he finds unacceptable). In Part
II he turns to the answers of philophers, in particular John Stuart
Mill and John Rawls, and then goes on to formulate his own view as
to what is, in his words, "the ultimate norm in a democratic
society" (p.6). Lastly he makes use of this norm to determine which
rights are fundamental and when they may be infringed.
In the Introduction Conklin discusses what he means by
"fundamental". This is the key term in his book and an ambiguous
one so that such a discussion is necessary. As Edel has pointed out,
when we say rights are fundamental we may mean either that they
are axiomatic in the moral system; i.e., that they are the rights from
which other rights derive, or that they have greater weight than
other rights within the moral system. I There are also other things we
may mean; e.g., that they are those rights which, for whatever
reason (perhaps their moral weight, but not necessarily) warrant
special legal protection such as constitutional entrenchment.
Conklin in explaining what he means by "fundaniental" refers to
various dictionary definitions, and then says:
The thrust of these definitions makes it clear that something is
fundamental if it is "at the root of the matter", "essential",
"basic", "underlying", "primary", "formative" or "irreducible". These are very strong words. They require that we place a
heavy burden upon those who would claim that the rights in any
country are fundamental fights. The definitions also tell us that
when reading judgments, statutes and legal writings, I should
look for something which tells us why rights are "at the root" of
the legal system, "essential", "basic", "underlying", "primary", "formative" or "irreducible" elements of the law in the
three countries under consideration (p.3).
1. Abraham Edel, "Somne Reflections on the Concept of Human Rights" in Ervin
H. Pollack, ed., Human Rights (Buffalo, N.Y.: Jay Stewart Publications, Inc.,
1971) at5.

In Defense of Fundamental Rights 191

This is vague and metaphorical language, but Conklin seems to be
saying that "fundamental" means axiomatic. However, in fact it is
his ultimate norm which is axiomatic. The remainder of his book
indicates that what he means by "fundamental" is of greater moral
weight. The issue of whether he thinks fundamental fights are
deserving of special legal protection will be discussed below.
In Part I Conklin evaluates three responses of judges and lawyers
to the question of what makes fundamental rights fundamental. First
he considers Chief Justice Coke's "backward looking" argument
that something is a fundamental right if there is longstanding
precedent for its being so. Conklin points out that there would be
very few fundamental rights in Canada on this approach; e.g., the
right to participate in elections has only been recently acquired, and
we have no consistent tradition of respecting religious freedom.
Next Conklin considers the view that something is a fundamental
right if contemporary values indicate it is. He expresses the three
forms of this view as follows:
It seems that the "contemporary values" method for establishing
the existence of fundamental rights has taken three quite different
forms in Anglo-Canadian-American legal literature. First, judges
have oftentimes suggested that in a civil liberties case they should
project into the record what they as judges consider to be the
dominant contemporary values of society. This was Lord
Devlin's idea of the "reasonable", "rightminded man". It also
underlay some of the judgements of Mr. Justice Marshall,
Cardozo, and Frankfurter. A second, Benthamite form of the
'"ill of the majc-ity" underlay the writings of some jurists.
Gallup polls, plebescites, communications between politican and
citizen, and the like have been used as indicia for the existence
(or non-existence) of fundamental rights. A third, more
traditional form has been the notion of the supremacy of the
legislature. We shall examine each in turn (p.5 5 ).
None of them he finds acceptable. The first form, which he refers to
as the shock the conscience argument, is too subjective. As to the
majority will argument, it is difficult to determine what the majority
will is, and anyway it may be wrong. And of the supremacy of the
legislature argument Conklin says, "How can a right be considered
fundamental if the legislature creates all rights, determines their
meaning and scope, and possesses the authority to destroy them?"
(p.77). He goes on in a very interesting discussion of the doctrine of
the supremacy of Parliament to argue it is in fact a normative rather
than a legal doctrine; i.e., it is not a duly enacted law but rather the
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grundnorm which determines what constitutes duly enacted laws.
He concludes that since it is a normative doctrine it should be
replaced if it is found wanting - and he finds it wanting.
Conklin then rejects the view that fundamental rights are those
rights which are entrenched in a constitution. 'He points out that
even if the constitution provides us with a list of fundamental rights
it does not tell us their scope or the appropriate level of judicial
scrutiny to determine whether they have been violated. These, he
concludes at the end of Part I, are normative questions.
Part II attempts to answer these and other normative questions.
Conklin's starting point is liberal political theory, and in particular
John Stuart Mill's concept of the inner sphere of life, that is, the
sphere of life which should be immune from state regulation. He
says:
If we could successfully construct an argument to justify why
society and the state ought not to penetrate the "inner sphere of
life" and if we described rights as the foundation-stones which
entrenched the boundaries of that sphere, we could quite
legitimately describe the rights as fundamental rights. The
number and scope of the fundamental rights, of course, would
depend upon what we meant by the term "the inner sphere of
life". Although we shall examine below what Mill himself meant
by the term, the "inner sphere of life" wouldprimafacie seem to
be bound up with a fundamental right of political and religious
conscience (p. 127).
This is a large assumption to make early in his quest to determine
what makes fundamental rights fundamental. Liberal political
theory is in effect the view that there is a sphere of life in which
people are free to behave badly - to publish pornography or hate
propaganda, to hold Nazi rallies, to be addicted to alcohol or drugs.
The alternative view - that in fact the state has jurisdiction to pass
laws in regard to all spheres of life although of course if it passes
bad laws it is subject to reprobation - is at least a tenable one. Even
if there is sphere of immunity, perhaps it is not where our
fundamental rights lie, or at least not their sole repository. Perhaps
we have fundamental rights not only to be free of certain laws but
also to be protected by others - for there to be laws against crime
and providing for medicae and so on. Conklin does acknowledge at
the beginning of Part II that his views presuppose a particular
political framework, and in his conclusion to a limited extent goes
beyond the view that fundamental rights have to do with protecting
the inner sphere of life from State regulation; i.e., to do with liberty.
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However, to a large extent his theory of fundamental rights is
coloured by his initial assumption.
Conklin examines Mill's view that the sphere of life which should
be free from State regulation is that in which we are engaged in
self-regarding conduct; i.e. as Conklin summarizes Mill's position,
"society might rightfully exercise authority over an individual
against the latter's will only for one reason; to prevent harm to
others" (p. 128), although, as Conklin points out, there are certain
positive duties of a minimal nature that Mill is willing to impose on
individuals. Conklin then looks at various rationale that have been
offered for the protection of self-regarding conduct from State
regulation. Utilitarianism does not provide an adequate rationale, he
contends, because there may well be cases where it will not be
conducive to the greatest happiness for the greatest number for
self-regarding conduct to go unregulated. As to Mill's argument that
it is for epistemological reasons that it should be left alone; i.e., that
"when it [the public] does interfere, the odds are that it interferes
wrongly, and in the wrong place" (quoted at p. 148), Conklin says:
This argument, however, assumes that there are such things as
"rightness" and "wrongness" This assumption seems to
coincide with a utilitarian perspective in that the rightness of an
action is gauged by its utilitarian relationship to the general
welfare. But could not a stronger argument be made that, with
respect to "self-regarding" conduct, an individual's conception
of rightness is just as valid as society's because we simply do not
know what is right or wrong in such contexts? The objection
which we should have toward the Puritans who prohibited music,
dance or theatre and the objection which we should have toward
the Spain of Mill's day which enforced a state religion is not, in
other words, that society may more often be wrong than right.
Rather, the objection is that, with respect to such matters, we just
do not know what is wrong or right and, therefore, the dissenter's
position is just as valid as the Puritan's or the state's.
In Chapter V Conklin temporarily leaves the issue of why
self-regarding conduct should be unregulated and turns to the
philosophy of John Rawls. Rawls says in effect that there are two
basic rights - the right to liberty, or at least to such basic liberties
as freedom of religion and freedom of speech, and the right that
social and economic inequalities be arranged so that they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage and (b)
attached to positions and offices open to all. However, at least if
certain minimum economic conditions are met, the right to the basic
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liberties always supercedes the qualified right to socio-economic
equality, because according to Rawls it is more intimately
connected with self respect than the right to increased wealth or
position. Self respect, Rawls concludes, is a primary social good
because
. . .without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things
have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire
and activity become empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and
cynicism (quoted at p. 180).
Moreover, Rawls goes on to conclude that since it is difficult to
maintain self respect without the respect of others, respect for
persons is a basic duty.
It is worth pointing out, although Conklin does not dwell on this,
that the "inner sphere of life" has quite different boundaries on
Rawls' theory than on Mill's. According to Mill, the state can only
pass laws to prevent us from harming each other, whereas according
to Rawls it is not self-regarding conduct which is protected from
State regulation, but rather conduct which involves an exercise of
such basic liberties as freedom of speech and religion. Selfregarding conduct is not coextensive with conduct involving an
exercise of the basic liberties. For example, suicide would be
included in the former but not the latter, whereas burning widows
on religious grounds would be included in the latter but not the
former. Also, Rawls supplements the right to liberty with the
qualified right to socio-economic equality, because the latter as well
as the former is necessary if we are to be free to carry out what he
calls our plan of life. Thus the right to liberty is defined differently
by Rawls than by Mill, and moreover is supplemented by other
rights so as to give us the right to freedom in a fuller sense; i.e., to
include, in the language of T.H. Green adopted by Conklin,
positive freedom as well as negative freedom (p. 192).
In Chapter VI Conklin draws on the philosophy of Mill and
Rawls to present his own view as to what makes fundamental rights
fundamental. He argues that the ultimate norm in a democratic
society is that each person is owed recognition respect as a person
who is an open-ended potentiality in the process of becoming.
Recognition respect is respect owed to a person independently4of his
status of merit, and is contracted with appraisal respect. The
concept of a person as an open-ended potentialility in the process of
becoming is preferred by Conklin to that of a person as an actual
bundle of desires or as a hypothetical ideal person. Thus according
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to Conklin each person is always in the process of change and
development, and moreover no value judgments may be made of
people.
I find the latter point hard to accept. I have no trouble in saying,
for example, that Martin Luther King Jr. was a better person than
Jim Jones. Conklin quotes with approval Mill's analogy of the
individual to "a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on
all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make
it a living thing" (quoted at p. 190). This may well be true, but
some trees are stunted or diseased or damaged whereas others
flourish. And this is a key point in Conklin's theory, as he uses it as
his justification for the principle of liberty implicit in his ultimate
norm; i.e.; as the reason the state should not regulate the inner
sphere of life.
The principle of liberty, however, is only one of two principles
contained in his ultimate norm. The other is the principle of
personal respect; i.e.; of adopting the other person's point of view:
"The individual's obligations are of two kinds: an attitude of
non-interference in the activities and thoughts of others, and a duty
of personal respect towards others" (page 211). He applies these
two principles in various fact situations to conclude that employers
do not have the right to discriminate on the basis of race nor
employees to enter contracts of slavery, but that people do have the
right to commit suicide, take whatever drugs they like, and not
fasten their seat belts. This is the part of his book I find the weakest.
I can't tell whose point of view I'm supposed to adopt when I apply
the principle of personal respect. For example, in the discrimination
case Conklin says the employer should adopt the employee's point
of view and hire him - why shouldn't the employee adopt the
employer's point of view and look for another job? And when the
two principles conflict, how does one know which controls? For
example, the principle of liberty in the discrimination case would
surely go against the duty to hire (although Conklin seems to say
otherwise), whereas the duty to show personal respect apparently
goes in favour of such a duty. Why does the latter consideration
outweigh the former?
In his last chapter Conklin makes use of his ultimate norm to
answer two questions: what rights are fundamental, and what moral
weight do such rights have? In regard to the first question, he gives
the following answer:
"Recognition respect for persons" would appear to require at
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least three avenues of constitutional inquiry. First, recognition
respect for persons proscribes discrimination on grounds of race,
sex, national origin and colour. Secondly, it precludes
interference with a person's life, his inner sphere of life, his
thoughts and feelings, the modes of his own expression and due
process. Thirdly, it requires that we ensure the equal worth of
these fundamental rights. This demands, in turn, that one
examine the socio-economic considerations surrounding the
effective exercise or non-exercise of the rights (p. 219-20).
The first proscription is unambiguous. The second is less so. The
right not to have one's life interfered with is subsequently referred
to by Conklin to as the right to life, but it does not appear to include
the right to positive assistance in order to ensure one's continued
existence nor the right to a certain quality of life. Thus the example
Conklin gives of a breach of this right is capital punishment. As to
the right to noninterference with one's thoughts and feelings, it is
not equivalent to the right to free speech. As Brandt has pointed out:
Freedom of speech has nothing to do with freedom of thinking
or conscience. Indeed, there cannot be interference with thinking
or conscience, since one's inner thoughts are not observable by
anyone but oneself. There can be influence on these, by
propaganda, by control of the channels of information; but that is
a different matter. Freedom of speech
means freedom to
2
communicate, either orally or in writing.
As an indication of what he means by the right to freedom of
thought, beliefs and feelings Conklin says people should not be
involuntarily detained in mental hospitals.
However, as Conklin points out, the second avenue of
constitutional inquiry also "incorporates the fundamental freedoms
of political participation, speech, religion, due process and
assembly" (p. 221). This is somewhat puzzling. In his general
discussion of the ultimate norm it was liberty in general that
deserved protection. Now it is only the "fundamental freedoms"
or, in Rawls' language, the basic liberties; i.e., freedom of religion,
speech, assembly, political participation and due process (one
wonders why due process is classified as a liberty or freedom).
Conklin says both the principle of personal respect and the principle
of liberty require that special protection be given the fundamental
freedoms:
2. Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,

Inc., 1959) at 450.
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These freedoms would appear to be fundamental largely
because they provide critical means of recognising the daimon or
"ideal possibility" within the individual. With respect to the
recognition element, a zone which constitutionally protects one's
political participation, expression and due process demonstrates
respect toward the ideal possibility within an individual. By
participating, for example, the individual becomes someone
"who counts for something in the community's decision making
processes." That is, his humanness which he shares equality with
others is being recognised. With respect to the second element,
participation in a common enterprise, expression through speech,
assembly or religion, or being assured of due process in matters
that might burden one's person: these elements delineate the
boundary lines within which the individual will fulfill his own
potentiality, his own person (p. 221).
However, it is at least arguable that if the justification for liberty lies
in the development of individuality, it is liberty in general rather
than the basic liberties which must be protected. We must be free
not only to be journalists or religious fanatics but also to be racing
car drivers or diamond thieves if each of us is to achieve his
particular daimon. As to Conklin's principle of personal respect, it
is an amorphous doctrine, and therefore it is hard to know whether it
would give rise to the right to liberty in general or only to the basic
liberties.
Lastly Conklin argues that socio-economic arrangements must be
such that the fundamental rights of every person are of equal worth.
In this he differs from Rawls. However, unlike Rawls he does not
supplement his basic liberties with an independent right to
socio-economic justice. This is a serious defect. Surely our right to
have enough to eat does not obtain simply to ensure that we are
strong enough to get to the polling booth. Most writers who stress
respect rather than freedom or liberty as the basic value in the
human rights area are more concerned with the satisfaction of needs
than with the protection of fundamental freedoms. Simone Weil, for
example, argues in The Need for Roots that there is "only one
obligation: respect", and that "[the] obligation is only performed if
the respect is effectively expressed in a real, not a fictitious, way;
and this can only be done through the medium of Man's earthly
needs".

3

In regard to the fundamental freedoms, on the other hand,

she says that people who misconduct themselves in speech are as
3. Simone Weil, The Need for Roots (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1971) at p. 6 .
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subject to reprobation as people who misconduct themselves in
action. But Conklin by defining persons as open-ended potentialities in effect collapses the right to respect to the duty to observe
the right to liberty.
As to the second issue dealt with in the last chapter; i.e., the
moral weight of fundamental rights, Conklin argues that it is very
great indeed, and that "[the] only circumstaces when. . .rights may
be compromised are when they conflict with other more important
rights" (p. 235) - it is not sufficient that they conflict with the
public interest (or indeed any individual's interests). This view is all
very well if one's list of fundamental rights is exhaustive, but if not
its application results in some serious jars to our moral sense. For
example, let us suppose that a child needs a blood transfusion but it
is against his parents' religion for him to have one. If we look to
Conklin's list, the only fundamental right involved in this situation
is the right to freedom of religion (unless, of course, one gives a
broader interpretation to the right to life than he appears to do).
Thus, the "interest" of the child in having his life preserved is not
sufficient to outweigh the right of the parents not to consent to the
transfusion.
As indicated above there are, I think, some fatal flaws in
Conklin's theory of fundamental rights. But his book is nevertheless
an important one. In it Conklin tries to answer a question of real
significance, one which is too often not posed, let alone
satisfactorily answered. And he recognizes that to answer this
question of what makes fundamental rights fundamental it is
necessary to venture into the normative realm. This is a point it is
hoped the judicary will recognize if the proposed Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms is in fact entrenched in the Constitution.
Perhaps the list of rights it contains would be less ad hoc and more
satisfactory if the persons who framed it had embarked on the task
Conklin set himself.
Barbara Hough
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University
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An International Criminal Court. By Benjamin Ferencz. Dobbs
Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1980. 2 vols. Pp. xvii, 538, 674. Price
$37.50 per vol.
InternationalCriminal Law. By M. Cherif Bassiouni. Alphen aan
den Rijn, Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980. Pp. xxxv and
250. Price $50.00
The activities of the war crimes tribunals after the Second World
War and particularly the Nuremberg Judgment resulted in the
decision of the United Nations to request the International Law
Commission to draft a Convention relating to Offences against the
Peace and Security of Mankind. This Convention was primarily
concerned with offences by or at the instigation of the state which
could be considered to amount to threats to the peace. Emphasis has
changed somewhat during recent years as a result of the activities of
terrorists, both within and without the borders of a single state.
Nowadays there is much pressure for the adoption of a criminal
code which will provide for universal jurisdiction over acts
considered to be offences against international law. Political
ideology and sympathy, however, may well result in a particular
state failing to exercise such jurisdiction over an alleged offender
present within its territory. It becomes clear, therefore, as was
recognized by the League of Nations when in 1937 it adopted both a
Convention against Terrorism and another embodying the Statute of
an International Criminal Court, neither of which came into force,
that the two are inextricably interwoven, such a court being
necessary if international criminal law is to be successfully
enforced.
The amount of official documentation and learned comment in
this field has become almost unmanageable (the bibliography in
Bassiouni's monograph runs to 70 pages, and this does not include
all the references in his footnotes), so that gratitude is due to anyone
who collates the material and makes it available in a readily usable
form. Insofar as An International Criminal Court is concerned,
Professor Ferencz, who had already placed us in his debt with a
compilation relating to the definition of international aggression,
has collected the material in two volumes, the first entitled Half a
Century of Hope and the second The Beginning of Wisdom, the two
together being described as A Step Toward World Peace. Volume 1
covers the period 1899 to 1948, beginning with the 1899
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Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and
proceeding by way of the 1907 unaccepted Convention for an
International Prize Court, the Report of 1919 on the Responsibility
of the Authors of the War and Enforcement of Penalties, the 1920
Proposals of the Committee of Jurists on an International Criminal
Court, the 1926 draft Statute proposed by the International Law
Association, the two League Conventions, the proposals relating to
the trials of war criminals after 1939, and the Nuremberg Charter of
1945, until it reaches the judgments of the two International
Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. It is interesting to note
that Professor Ferencz provides a mere twelve-page summary of the
Nuremberg Judgment, completely ignoring the dissent of the Soviet
judge, while his summary of Tokyo, normally considered the less
significant of the two judgments, receives 34 pages, of which only
three deal with the majority opinion, the remainder being devoted to
the dissenting opinions of Judge Roling of the Netherlands (17
pages) and Judge Pal of India (10 pages).
In his introduction to Volume 1 Professor Ferencz comments
upon the 'achievements' of 70 years. He states that
... proponents of an International Criminal Court never
suggested that such a Court should serve as a mask of justice to
hide the face of vengeance. Nor was the Court conceived as an
instrumentality to guard the status quo in a changing world. A
Tribunal, to be effective, would require a dynamic conception of
justice. It would have to function within the frame-work of
principles generally agreed upon and its integrity would have to
be broadly recognized. Code, Court and Enforcement would be
the essential components of an integrated system for the
prohibition of international violence (p. 8 9).
He recognizes that
• . .there were ups and downs in the process of evolutionary
development and it would be understandable if some would say
that it was nothing more than a ride on a carousel which ended
where it began. But that would be an incomplete picture. The
outstanding fact is that progress - however cautious - was
made in a relatively brief historical span. Despite all the
vicissitudes and the doubts, the idea of an International Criminal
Court remained vital and irrepressible (p.90).
But the idea of a world state and a world government also remains
vital and irrepressible for some, and it can hardly be said that we are
any nearer their attainment today than we were in 1899.
The idea of an international criminal code and the court necessary
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to enforce it remains attractive and - like so many motherhood
proposals of the United Nations - is difficult to oppose. However,
if one looks at the world as it is, taking the United Nations as its
barometer, it is difficult to maintain that the carousel ride of volume
1 has in fact changed in any way. It remains an interminable
circuitous switchback and the collection of documents to be found
in Volume 2, despite the hopefulness underlying that volume's title,
does nothing to change one's view. Here we find the plethora of
reports that have come out of the International Law Commission
relating to the Nuremberg Principles as well as the draft Code of
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind; the Genocide
Convention and the documents leading to its adoption; the reports
and proposals of the Committee on International Criminal
Jurisdiction together with a draft Statute for a Court; the
Conventions on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomats, and that of
1979 on the Taking of Hostages, together with the instruments
leading to the postponement of action on a Convention concerning
Terrorism. It is perhaps unfortunate that Professor Ferencz does not
provide a list of states ratifying the various Conventions referred to,
for this would emphasise how little has in fact been achieved, and
would draw attention to the significance of politics in this field - a
significance which is particularly clear in relation to the crime of
apartheid, and which is emphasised by the provisions of the
Resolution to which the Convention on Internationally Protected
Persons is annexed.
Professor Ferencz has tended to confine himself to those
international documents which clearly relate to the activities of an
international court. As a result, he omits from his collection such
important documents in the field of international criminal law as the
Convention against Limitation Periods in relation to war crimes and
the Tokyo, Montreal and Hague Conventions relative to aerial
hijacking and other crimes affecting aircraft. If there were such a
Court, one might hope that its jurisdiction would extend to such
matters too. It is in this connection that Professor Bassiouni's
monograph becomes relevant, for it carries the subtitle 'A Draft
International Criminal Code'. His introductory chapter on the
history and scope of international criminal law indicates that
concern with this matter goes much further back than the opening
point of Professor Ferencz' collection, for he shows how significant
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were national regulatory codes for the armed forces which
introduced criminal sanctions for offences which today would be
considered contrary to the law of armed conflict and, as such,
international crimes which should be dealt with by an international
tribunal. In a mere 6 pages he carries the story from Sun Tzu in the
fourth century B.C. to Nuremberg and Tokyo. Moreover, in this
introductory chapter he refers to a variety of international
conventions relating to slavery, the traffic in women and children,
narcotics offences, piracy and hijacking, terrorism, obscene
publications, aggression, apartheid, genocide and torture, which
indicate how busy an international criminal court might be if it ever
came into existence. This list also serves to show that a collection of
documents based solely on proposals for such a court only partially
tells the story.
The largest part of InternationalCriminalLaw (some 60 pages)
comprises the contents of the Code. Professor Bassiouni, in his
capacity as Chairman of the relevant Committee of Experts of the
International Association of Penal Law, considers that such a Code
should apply to aggression (retaining the unfortunate provision in
the General Assembly's definition which excludes from condemnation acts done in the name of self-determination) as well as to war
crimes, unlawful use of weapons, with a clear ban on explosive and
expandable bullets, asphyxiating gases (which would probably
leave untouched lachrimose agents like CS which might also have a
fatal and disabling effect), and chemical and bacteriological agents.
Interestingly enough, there is no prohibition of nuclear or other
weapons having a longterm deleterious effect, even though some of
the latter have been declared illegal under the 1977 Protocol on
Humanitarian Law in International Armed Conflicts. The Code
would also make criminal genocide, crimes against humanity,
apartheid (in a form that is somewhat wider than the normal use of
this term restricting it to South Africa), slavery, torture and
unlawful medical experimentation (with a careful provision
regulating the issue of consent to such acts), piracy, crimes relating
to international air communications (but there is no provision for
similar criminal activities at sea or on land), threats and the use of
force against internationally protected persons (on this occasion
there is no special protection for those claiming to be acting in the
name of self-determination), and the taking of hostages. There is a
special provision concerning the torture of a hostage, and the
definition here is wide enough to cover pretty well every act of
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ill-treatment reported to have been perpretrated against the
Americans in Tehran, for it is enough to inflict severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, whereas the crime of torture
per se has to be committed "by or at the instigation of a public
official or for which a public official is responsible". In addition to
these more modern offences, the Code includes a number which are
traditionally condemned by international treaty - unlawful use of
the mails, drug offences, falsification and counterfeiting, interference with submarine cables, international traffic in obscene
publications, and, reflecting more modern concepts, the theft of
national and archeological treasures and bribery of foreign public
officials. Surprisingly, there is no reference to over-fishing or the
preservation of endangered species.
The remaining two sections of this exposition of International
CriminalLaw are concerned with procedures of indirect and direct
enforcement. The former relates to the exercise of national
jurisdiction and the problem of international cooperation, e.g., aut
dedere aut judicare, extradition (with exclusion of the political
offence exception), judicial assistance, recognition of foreign
judgments, and the transfer of offenders and execution of the
sentences abroad. Insofar as the individual offender is concerned,
the only provision relates to the right to appear, to oppose an
extradition request, to be represented by counsel and to be heard
before an impartial tribunal "under fair procedures in conformity
with the laws of" the country before whose court he is appearing hardly a guarantee of the rule of law! Direct enforcement depends
upon the activities of an international criminal court, and to this end
there is a thirteen article draft statute.
Taken together the volumes on An InternationalCriminal Court
edited by Ferencz and the small work on International Criminal
Law representing the activities of the Bassiouni Committee
constitute enough raw material for those who wish to work in this
field. They can hardly be said, however, to have exhausted the
subject and there is ample scope for further research and analysis.
L.C. Green
University Professor
The University of Alberta
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Atiyah Rules, O.K.?
The Rise and Fallof Freedom of Contract. By P.S. Atiyah. Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1979. Pp. ix, 791. Price $78.50
In his essay "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication"'
Duncan Kennedy argued
that there are two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with
substantive issues, which I call individualism and altruism. There
are also two opposed modes for dealing with questions of the
form in which legal solutions to the substantive issues should be
cast. One formal mode favors the use of clearly defined, highly
administrable, general rules; the other supports the use of
ad hoc decisions with relatively
equitable standards producing
2
little precedential value.
Kennedy went on to suggest that the IiA bet'%~e thiei oposing
views of form and substance was that
altruist views of substance private law issues lead to willingness
to resort to standards in administration, while individualism
seems to harmonize with an instance on rigid rules rigidly
applied.3
In two works of radically different scope Professor Atiyah of
Oxford University has articulated a view of English legal history
which, in my view, bears out Kennedy's assertions. The first is his
inaugural lecture, "From Principles to Pragmatism" ,4 in which
Professor Atiyah outlined briefly the transition in theform of private
law adjudication from what Kennedy described as reliance upon
"clearly defined, highly administrable, general rules" (principles),
which dominated legal reasoning in the last century to the modern
"use of equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with
relatively little precedential value" (pragmatism).
The second work is The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. In
this richly textured book Professor Atiyah traces and reveals
changes in the substance of private law adjudication by focussing
upon the idea of contractual liability as it has evolved over the
course of English legal history from roughly the beginning of the
seventeenth century. The conclusion is simply, as the title suggests,
1. (1976), 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685
2. Id
3. Id.
4. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
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that the nature and basis of contractual liability has changed and that
we are witnessing what in Kennedy's language is a shift from
individualism to altruism. A note of warning must be immediately
sounded. This is not a long dry tome in which an Oxford scholar
plods some lost by-way of English legal history in the name of an
unfathomable thesis. This book is as much a political, social,
economic, and intellectual history of England as it is a legal history.
It is, as one would expect, both learned and lucid. But it is also
delightful in its rich detail, its bizarre anecdotes, its potted
biographies of leading characters, and its never ending chain of
interesting ideas. The major virtue of the book is its drawing of
English legal history into the mainstream of English history and the
author's manifest ability to show the life of the law as part of, and
reflecting, life in general.
U

Professor Atiyah begins his book with the claim that "the nature
of contractual and promissory liability have been largely misunderstood by lawyers, philosophers, and others" (p.1). This is largely
because theorizing about the nature of contractual liability has been
dominated by a classical model developed in the nineteenth century.
This model did not just happen to develop but was the creation of
the intellectual climate of the times, which stressed self-reliance,
individualism, and freedom of contract. The irony and the difficulty
is that the classical model continues to control thinking about
contractual liability while the ideas and values which favored its
creation have long since lost their status as self-evident truths. 5
The purpose of Professor Atiyah's book is to trace the rise of this
classical theory, to explain it,as the product of the social, economic,
political, and philosophical vectors acting upon it and to
demonstrate the radical alteration in those forces necessary to both
create and destroy the need for such a theory. To achieve this end
the outline of the book is elegant and structured. It contains three
parts, The Beginnings of Freedom of Contract: The Story to 1770,
The Age of Freedom of Contract: 1770-1870, and The Decline and
Fall of Freedom of Contract: 1870-1970. Each of these three parts
contains sections n "The C0nditin of England", "The
Intellectual Background", and "The Legal Background". Part II of
the book is the most richly developed.
5. Professor Atiyah's account purportedly stops at 1970. One wonders how he
views the rise of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Milton Friedman.
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III
Any modem course in contract law revolves around three central
concepts introduced by Fuller and Purdue in their famous "Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages". 6 In Professor Atiyah's language,
these three concepts are promise based liability, reliance based
liability, and benefit based liability. If A promises to sell B one ton
of wheat for $100, delivers the wheat, and B refuses to pay, it is
clear that A may sue B, but why? Becuase A relied on B's promise
and delivered the wheat? Because B was benefited by the receipt of
the wheat? Or because Bpromised to pay?
Atiyah's central theoretical points are that the classical theory of
freedom of contract is centered on the notion of promise based
liability, that it treats as its "paradigm" case that of the totally
executory contract where no acts of reliance or benefit have been
undertaken or received, and that it offers as its standard remedy the
expectation (lost profit) interest. Under such a theory, contractual
liability is, and can only be, promisory liability and thus purely
consensual, the product of the will of the parties. Such thinking
serves nicely to cut contract off from the law of tort or restitution
where liabilities are not voluntarily assumed by the parties but
imposed by law. This model of self-imposed, freely chosen,
consensual obligations was entirely in harmony with the principles
of individualism and self-reliance. Reliance based and benefit based
liabilities, which involve the imposition of liability without consent
were discordant notions. It was in this period that the whole of the
law of restitution was explained away as turning on implied
promises, not benefit received. Also developing from the same
philosophical traditions were the notions of caveat emptor which
was based on the virtues of self-reliance, the notion that the courts
had no role in relieving parties from their freely entered into
bargains, an extreme emphasis on "principle" and "the long run"
at the expense of immediately visible unjust results, and the decline
of equity. Professor Atiyah's case for locating the classical theory of
promise based liability within the England of its time is most
convincing. The link to the dominant philosophical ideas of the
times, especially those of the new political economists and the
utilitarians is clearly made.
The notion that there has been both a rise as well as a fall of the
doctrine of freedom of contract involves the proposition that there
6. (1936), 46 Yale L.J. 52 and 353.
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was a time before the classical theory became dominant in which
liability was neither regarded as promise based or strictly
consensual in nature. In making this part of the argument both
Professor Atiyah 7 and his American counterpart Morton Horwitz 8
have been criticized on the basis that elements of the classical theory
were present in the law long before the proclaimed classical period.
I am in no position to act as judge in this war of legal historians. But
these arguments seem to me to be merely arguments about history
and neither make nor break the much more critical propositions that
the classical theory and its intellectual underpinnings have fallen,
that there has been a resurgence of benefit and reliance based
liability, that this resurgence reflects values of a new age, and that it
is time for a new theory which both draws upon our altered values
and makes sense of what judges are actually doing in concrete
cases.
On these propositions, Professor Atiyah is on more certain
ground. That the old theory still has a grip is demonstrated in our
desire to explain, as being examples of promissory liability, cases
where the real reason for liability is reliance or benefit based. The
examples of collatoral contract, misrepresentation, the irrevocability of unilateral offers once performance has begun, and promissory
estoppel come to mind. Professor Atiyah here clearly demonstrates
that the emperor has no clothes. It is, I think, also clear that the
virtues of self-reliance and individualism have declined since the
last century and that there is a significant trend in favour of equality,
fairness, and paternalism in our society and in our law of
obligations. Professor Atiyah makes his case for these propositions
by reference to developments in England in this century. How easily
these notions can be transported to Canada is obviously a matter for
some debate but it seems to me that there are obvious parallels if not
total congruency. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that
Professor Atiyah has a grip on an important idea with great power to
explain much of what we see about us and much of what we read in
the case reports. The breakdown of the classical theory and the
values which support it is amply demonstrated.
Professor Atiyah does not, however, develop a new theory of
contractual liability but states, on the last page of his book, that he
7. Baker, Review, (1980), 43 Mod. Law Rev. 467.
8. The Transformation of American Law: 1780-1860, c.6 (Harvard U. Press,
1977) criticized in Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts
(1979), 46 U. Chic. L. Rev. 533.
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hopes to return to the task. It will be an enormous undertaking. This
is because rejection of the classical theory of contractual liability
based on promissory liability has implications for the whole of our
law of obligations. The recognition of reliance based and benefit
based liabilities portends the breakdown of the notion of water fight
compartments of contract, tort, and restitution. The task to which
Professor Atiyah hopes to return is nothing less than the shaping of a
theory for the whole of our law of obligations.
IV
This is truly a remarkable book. It would be a mistake to regard it
as simply a book for contract lawyers and legal historians. This is a
book for any well educated lawyer. I hope that it finds a wide
audience for a particular reason. The one pervasive defect in the
legal work performed in the law schools, law offices, and the courts
of this country is the use of formalistic legal reasoning. The fomalist
proceeds in the belief that legal principles can be understood
without an inquiry concerning their history or purpose and that "the
mere invocation of rules and the deduction of conclusions from
them is . . . sufficient for every authoritative legal choice".

9

The

classical doctrines of the law of contract (such as "consideration")
are most easily fitted to the formalistic view of the world. Professor
Atiyah's book will rock the foundation of the most solid of
formalistic outlooks. It will do so without dogma, without romantic
reductionism about the source of legal rules, but rather by a long,
searching, and insightful look into the nitty-gritty of soci-economic,
political and intellectual history.
Brian Langille
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

Lawyers. By Jack Batten. Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1980.
Pp. 241. Price: $16.95.
This review must begin with a confession of bias. I approached
this book with low expectations because of two personal encounters
with the author, Jack Batten. In the spring of 1978, Mr. Batten
9. Unger, Law in Modern Society (New York: The Free Press, 1976).
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interviewed students and faculty at Dalhousie Law School,
including myself, for an article which was published by Imperial Oil
Ltd. 1 Mr. Batten left an impression of unbridled optimism and
journalistic superficiality, which was not dispelled when the article
appeared in published form.
In the fall of 1980, Mr. Batten spoke to a large group of
Dalhousie law students and faculty about the object of this review
- Lawyers. He candidly admitted that this was part of a
promotional tour and that he was an unabashed fan of lawyers. His
mission was telling all who would listen that lawyers were
wonderful and admirable creatures and that most criticism of the
profession was unwarranted. Unable to acquiesce in such idolizing
of lawyers, I interrupted Mr. Batten's account with the following
caustic remark, which was quoted in the next day's edition of the
Toronto Globe and Mail:
Mr. Batten, your glowing account of lawyers is as devoid of
critical analysis as a "rock groupies" account of a Rolling
Stones' concert.
This admittedly ill-tempered remark can only be explained by the
fact that I was no longer a humble law student, but rather a
self-indulgent member of faculty, who had been angered by what I
viewed as a simplified and distorted version of reality.
Lawyers rose above what was expected. It provided a more
pleasant encounter with Mr. Batten than the previous two. The
author describes lawyers in a readable and engaging fashion and
allows lawyers to tell their own stories. The high powered corporate
lawyer, the children's crusader, the country lawyer, the criminal
lawyer, the prosecutor and many others emerge from the pages of
the book.
However, except for one sojourn to Yellowknife (pp. 114-37) the
book deals with Ontario lawyers. Even more surprisingly, the book
does not describe a single female lawyer. This fact coupled with the
author's concluding comments may well give cause for suspicion:
I'd set out deliberately to hunt down lawyers who stirred my
respect, to find out what separated me, the indifferent lawyer of
years ago, from the guys who had such grand talents for the
profession [emphasis added] (p.241).
When at the end of the day an assessment is made of what stirred
the author's "respect", both women lawyers and those outside
1. J. Batten, "Dalhousie: A little less is more", (1978) The Review (No. 6), 19.
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Ontario can consider themselves lucky not to be on Mr. Batten's
list. In my opinion, the author of Lawyers and its cast of
practitioners exemplify many of the worst characteristics of the
legal profession.
Mr. Batten concludes Lawyers with an account of Igor Kaplan,
who represents the author's ideal of the all-around general
practitioner. This is the same Igor Kaplan who as lawyer to Conrad
Black of Argus Corporation assisted the Blacks in their 1978
squeeze out of the two widows, Mrs. Bud McDougald and her sister
Mrs. Eric Phillips.2 Mr. Kaplan is quoted in the book as speaking
proudly of his role in the takeover:
This turned out to be my one big contribution to the whole
enterprise. I took it on myself to sign an agreement on behalf of
the two ladies to sell their shares in Ravelston to the Blacks. I
decided I could sign the agreement for them. I don't know to this
day whether I was right or wrong. I don't have to know any
more. But I took the position I was their attorney-in-law (p. 2 33).
If this is the kind of heroic lawyering that stirs Mr. Batten's
respect, I shudder at the thought of the villainous lawyer! Of course,
Mr. Batten also agreed with Paul Moore of the prestigious Toronto
law firm of Tory Tory (p.240), who is quoted in the following
passage:
How could I be a productive member of society defending guys
who are already guilty of something? I joined Tory's and burned
the midnight oil learning about corporate securities work. That
was a very right decision on my part. It's the business aspect of
Canadian ife that produces the country's weallh. I mean
everybody from the Avon lady to the guy who runs a Becker's
store to the Bronfman family. I work for those people. I'm loyal
to business. That means I'm socially useful. And it doesn't hurt
to get paid well for it either (pp. 149-150).
I do not share the same view of social utility. Far from being
"productive" members of society, those who blindly prop up the
established order of things perpetuate injustice and social
inequality. Protecting the principle that a person is innocent until
proven guilty is surely as "socially useful" as doing the legal
paperwork for wealthy clients. Of course, as Mr. Moore noted, the
2. Peter Newman's The Canadian Establishment, Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1975, provides a detailed account of corporate power in Canada. The
details of this particular take-over were part of a Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation 1981 documentary, based on the book and called "The Canadian
Establishment".
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former does not pay nearly as well.
It is not only corporate lawyers who stir Mr. Batten's respect. He
provides a glowing account of a litigation lawyer, Martin Wunder,
whom he describes as "Lawyer for the Oppressed" (pp.20-48).
Included in this chapter is a touching account of the human tradgedy
of the landmark damages case of Teno v. Arnold.3 However, it does
not seem to have occurred to the author that even in the days of
insurance, defendants as well as plaintiffs might be "oppressed".
Unfortunately, neither lawyers nor their plaintiff clients can always
be on the side of the angels.
In fact every single lawyer in Lawyers is one for whom the author
has admiration and respect. Criminal defence lawyers, prosecutors,
the country lawyer 4 and the divorced lawyers who are wedded to
their work - all engender Mr. Batten's respect. To be fair to the
author, he also respects lawyers who challenge the established order
such as Jeffrey Wilson, the children's crusader (pp. 201-227), and
Jack Johnson, the Ontario lawyer who dabbled in leftist politics (pp.
168-72).
The author's lack of discriminating taste may be Lawyers greatest
flaw. Mr. Batten may have something in common with Will
Rogers, the American humourist, in that he also appears to "have
never met a lawyer that he did not respect". There are members of
the legal profession who do not deserve respect and a book which
claims to remove the mystique from lawyers should confront this.
The fact that the author does not confront this subtracts from his
credibility as a writer.
There are other things about Lawyers which are disconcerting
apart from its non-critical approach. The practice of law is not all
excitement and glitter. There is as high a component of routine and
boring work as there is in any other vocation. Not all lawyers are
enamoured with their jobs. Not even those Batten interviewed could
be as positive about lawyering on a day to day basis. In this respect
Mr. Batten adds to the mystique of the legal profession rather than
reduces it. By so doing he does a disservice to his readers.
Another disconcerting feature of the book is the journalistic
excess of the author. Everytime Mr. Batten interviews a lawyer at a
restaurant (a frequent occurrence), the reader is given a detailed
3. (1978), 3 C.C.L.T. 272 (S.C.C.)
4. Mr. Batten emphasizes the slow paced life style of the country lawyer who
drinks scotch, listens to classical music and plays with his children. Is this the
typical country lawyer?
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account of what the lawyer ate. Is this really relevant to the
character of the lawyer? Perhaps Mr. Batten has an elaborate theory
about the relationship between diet and high quality lawyering, but
if he has the reader remains uninformed of it. Short of such a theory,
it appears no more relevant than what Mick Jagger eats for breakfast
on the day of a Rolling Stones' concert.
The remark about groupies and the Rolling Stones was made in
ignorance of two interesting facts - first that Jack Batten had been
a reviewer of rock music performances including those of the
Rolling Stones, 5 and secondly that Lawyers was conceived as a
result of Mr. Batten's involvement as an expert witness in the trial
of Rolling Stones drummer, Keith Richards, (pp. 1-6). He gave
testimony as to the talents, fame and wealth of Keith Richards, who
was being sentenced for a narcotics conviction.
Having carefully read Lawyers as objectively as possible, I
conclude that it would be more appropriately entitled Lawyers: A
Fan Club's View. Included in this fan club would be the many
lawyers whom Mr. Batten interviewed such as Austin Cooper who
spoke glowingly of the "hired gun" model of the criminal lawyer
(pp.4-6), and Shelly Altman who described criminal law as a game
"but seriously played" (p. 80). It is interesting to discover what
lawyers say about themselves, and Jack Batten is a good listener and
story teller. However, the disappointing thing about Lawyers is that
it does not go beyond the anecdotes and provide any real insight into
what makes lawyers tick. There is only one lawyer in the whole
book of whom the author is at all critical, and that is lack Batten
himself. 6 If he had directed some of this critical assessment toward
the parade of lawyers whom he assumed had made it, Lawyers
would have been a much better book. Mr. Batten might have been
more successful in capturing what had alluded him about lawyering
if he had not been president of the fan club.
A. Wayne MacKay
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University

5. For five years in the late 1960's and early 1970's Jack Batten reviewed the rock
bands who passed through Toronto for the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail.
6. Jack Batten was called to the Ontario Bar in 1959 and practised law in a Toronto
firm until 1963 when he embarked upon his present career as a journalist and
writer.
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Humanity in Warfare. By Geoffrey Best. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1980. Pp: 400. Price: $25.00 (U.S.)
Interest has been rekindled in the law of armed conflict in recent
years by the Vietnam conflict and by the protracted international
conferences at Geneva which produced the Protocols Additional to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1977 and a Convention and
Protocols concerned with restrictions on weapons use in 1980.
Geoffrey Best, a British historian whose primary field is Victorian
England, has ventured onto a nearly unexplored territory, the
history of the humanitarian law of armed conflict. Best is well
aware that the juxtaposition of "humanitarian" and "law" with
"armed conflict" may seem incongruous to many. He adopts the
position, however, that the law of armed conflict does produce
some tangible humanitarian benefits, unfortunately marginal at
times, and that the existence and dissemination of this law helps to
foster a climate of opinion in which military personnel are more
likely to choose a civilized course of action when options are
available in combat. Lawyers and legal scholars who have devoted
effort to human rights law nationally or internationally may have
considerable sympathy for this position.
Best adopts an intellectual history approach, focusing on the
evolution of basic concepts rather than case studies of specific
incidents. He begins with a review of what he calls the "later
Enlightenment consensus" of the middle and later eighteenth
century. In his view, a consensus existed at that time whereby war
was a matter which involved states, in particular their regular
military and naval forces, and had minimal impact on individual
citizens. A statement of this consensus is contained in Rousseau's
Social Contract, "war ...

is not a relationship between man and

man, but between State and State, in which private persons are only
enemies accidentially, not as men, nor even as citizens, but simply
as soldiers". As a result of this approach, a law of war was
developed which concentrated exclusively on relations between
opposing armed forces. Any injury caused to the civilian population
was disregarded as an unavoidable accident of war. In contrast to
Rousseau, Vattel took the view that once war began the entire
enemy population must be regarded as enemies. Vattel's concept of
the law of war was much broader, embracing the entire spectrum of
relations between opposing states and their populations. Utilizing
this approach one was obliged to discriminate between dangerous
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enemies, usually enemy soldiers, and enemies who did not pose a
threat. The infliction of hardships on non-threatening enemies had
to be justified by some form of necessity. It could not be ignored as
an incidental feature of 'war. The contrast between the approaches of
Rousseau and Vattel runs throughout the book. The author
considers that excessive reliance on the approach of Rousseau,
together with the self interest of the professional military, have
resulted in the development of a law of armed conflict primarily
concerned with the protection of combatants rather than innocent
civilians. Whether or not this argument is valid for the period prior
to the First World War, and the author does present a very
convincing case, its validity at the present time is debatable. As one
example, the recent UN Conference on Conventional Weapons
adopted a protocol restricting the use of incendiary weapons against
military objectives in populated areas. It was impossible to obtain
agreement on restrictions of use against combatants.
Throughout the book, Best makes a large number of illuminating
observations. He comments on the militarization of Red Cross
Societies, observes that bombardment of civilians has been viewed
by continental European writers as a peculiarly and characteristically British (later Anglo-American) way of warfare, and castigates,
legitimately, a number of international lawyers for writing as
advocates of national positions rather than as impartial jurists. As
one who read C.J. Colombos' hagiography of the Royal Navy while
searching, unsuccessfully, for a usable law of the sea text, I
consider the castigation occasionally justified.
One does not have to agree with a book to find it interesting. On
one matter, the strategic air offensive in World War II, the author
ventures into a brief case study. Possibly in order to provide a
balanced account, he makes a strong argument that the British
bombing offensive which concentrated on area bombardment,
"dehousing the population", was immoral, illegal and planned with
malice aforethought. The bombing offensives of World War II still
raise moral and legal qualms. Condemnation of the bombing
offensive as conducted by the Royal Air Force may well be
justified. At the same time, however, the author applauds the
United States Army Air Force for its emphasis on precision
bombing. When one considers deficiencies in training and
technology at the time and weather conditions over the targets, it is
probable that the civilian population at the receiving end frequently
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found it difficult to differentiate between "precision bombing" and
"dehousing the population".
The author has the best of humanitarian intentions. At times,
however, his arguments inadvertently support inhumane results. For
example, he suggests that the insistence by the professional military
that non-professional opponents distinguish themselves from the
civilian population is a holdover from the days of "gentlemanly
warfare". The major reason for insisting on this distinction is to
protect the innocent civilian population, presumably a humanitarian
objective. If everyone wears a cerise bath robe and some people
wearing cerise bath robes shoot at soldiers, even the best disciplined
soldiers may react as if everyone in a cerise bath robe is an enemy
combatant.
In summary, the book is a useful and insightful venture onto
unexplored terrain. It links law with history but generally at a rather
abstract level. Notwithstanding recent history, those who plan
international law curricula tend to assume armed conflict is unreal
as well as unpleasant. For this reason the law of armed conflict is
ignored entirely or placed at the tail end of basic international law
courses. Humanity in Warfare serves as a useful corrective. It will
also, one hopes, encourage others to venture into the field.
W.J. Fenrick*
Director Law /International
Office of the Judge Advocate General
Department of National Defence
Ottawa, Ontario
*Views expressed in this review are those of the author only, and not of the
Canadian government.

